BROWN
The attempt would be made, in a serious fashion, to match the resources to the needs. Initially, it was to be called the Demonstration Cities Program, but President Johnson grumbled that there were already too many demonstrations around the White House and elsewhere, so they changed the title to Model Cities.
What happened? The first plan called for concentration of planning effort and a lot of money on a very few cities, perhaps five or six. Cities with manifest urban problems were considered. Then, however, the policy planners wondered, who was going to say no to all the Democratic mayors that would not have their cities funded? It was considered politic to have several more cities, perhaps 50.
Then, the policy makers thought about the realities of getting the program through Congress. Fifty cities were considered too few to be approved by 100 senators and 435 representatives. They ended up with what they felt was the minimum set necessary to get the bill passed, which turned out to be 150 cities. That defused the resources rather considerably. I was always amused to note that the city I grew up in, Binghamton, New York with 65,000 people at that time, was a Model City.
With the cities picked, the next part of the plan was to concentrate the money on specific areas within the city. Rather than spread the resources over the entire city (in each of the 150 cities), the planners intended to pick the model neighborhood that had the worst problems and concentrate on the problems of that area. How would that be accomplished? Generally, the mayor of the city identified the model areas, and elections were held within those areas for citizen boards. Resident participants helped to set priorities through some collaborative effort on the part of city hall and elected representatives from the Model Neighborhood.
As one resident said, somewhat plaintively, "everything is a priority." In short order, dozens of priorities were found, and it was very difficult to say no to someone. If the duly elected representatives of the neighborhood said, "This is the priority of the people that I'm speaking for," an administrator could not say, "Sorry, it's not a high-end priority." The result was long laundry lists, sometimes extending to 50 or 60 or more projects, and one could understand why. Education, housing, law enforcement, jobs, and neighborhood health centers were all highpriority needs. So, the money became defused further among these various policy areas, across the "model" cities, and the promise of concentrated targeted resources grew more distant.
There was a supposed saving grace to the process. The money that was appropriated through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the Model Cities Program was not supposed to be the lion's share of So, the HUD money, small as it was and diffused as it was among priorities and cities, ended up being the lion's share of what was spent on Model Cities.
The idea was a good one, but, as foretold in Genesis, it was diffused all over the land in the same way as the languages were scattered when the Tower of Babel was destroyed. The money was spread across 150 cities and was further diffused over dozens of priorities within those cities. It was spread among people who really did speak different languages, in a certain sense, and sometimes literally; there is enormous heterogeneity within the inner cities of our hardpressed larger cities. It also encountered a different language problem, a particularly frustrating one, when Model Cities proponents discovered that the federal agencies did not speak each other's language either when it came to concentrating these resources on an area or jurisdiction.
In 1974, the Model Cities Program came to an end. Then there was a great deal of talk at the federal level about revenue sharing and block grants and things that would diffuse money, in many respects taking money away from HUD's categorical programs for cities and putting it out in the counties and the suburbs that were growing rapidly. There was very little talk thereafter, however, about federal urban policy nor has there been much since, even under Carter and Clinton, our two Democratic presidents since Lyndon Johnson. To complicate the issue even further, health care is not necessarily the item on the list that is most conducive to the health of these populations. Some communities are trying to improve health and safety by reducing violence, drugs, teen pregnancy, and the like. Many of them are saying that health care is very important, but maybe we should put more emphasis on education so that children will be able to read well by the third grade, and will not face nine more demoralizing years before "graduation," and so may be more inclined to get something out of school and plan for the future rather than dropping out and getting involved in illicit activities. Maybe education is the root, rather than health services, conventionally defined. Maybe jobs are key.
Such considerations are important to contemplate. Again, however, the focus blurs on the issue of the place and the priority of health care in this mix of social needs and services and what is most conducive to improved health. The focus is not necessarily on more spending on health care and health programs.
Cities have a special claim to the aid of policy makers because they are hit especially hard by the transformations that are sweeping over our system at present, and they have a special claim to assistance. After all, purchasers are driving harder bargains, so there is less slack in insurance premiums with which to cross-subsidize uninsured populations. There is less support for essential community providers and public hospitals, leaving urban populations vulnerable. The public-sector safety net is in tatters. Hospital downsizing hurts the urban poor because it costs them jobs, and also it damages their access because they have less resort to easy transportation when nearby facilities are closed. This proposition is true and is not confined to big cities. Small cities and rural areas may be even more dependent on the fate of their community hospital as a source of employment and economic activity. In some places, when the hospital--the major employer--closes, the community is finished. The grocery store owner and the furniture repairperson and the gas station attendant will not be far behind in closing up their businesses and leaving town.
If those who are less well off are being hurt economically by the supposed efficiencies that we are introducing, it is not clear that the urban poor, particularly the center-city poor, are a special case deserving special attention. They may be, but the issue is not decided. In any case, the focus again blurs over the implications of these larger trends for vulnerable populations.
As a final example, consider the proposition that urban health problems really are not in any deep sense urban at all. The financing system is really at fault, Cities have real liabilities, and this has always been true. They are home to waves of poor people, including foreigners; they have been subject to these upstatedownstate or in-state-out-of-state splits that can be quite bitter in political terms; they are the sites of internal tensions and divisions over race, class, ethnicity, and the like; they are more heterogeneous than smaller types of jurisdictions, which makes for much suspicion, not only among the urban dwellers themselves, but between them and the more homogeneous, suburban community dwellers, say, who resent the idea of all those suspect people hanging out down there, taking one's tax money.
All kinds of conflicts are fought over political turf, and there is a pervasive antiurban bias in many of our states and regions. They sense that cities are losing population relative to suburbs, that their day has come and gone, and that suburbs are the center of action where one should concentrate resources. There is also a sense of job loss and loss of economic activities in the cities, causing them to be a drain on the resources of the region. Such conflicts and perceptions lead to the blurring of focus when one discusses the benevolent impulses of urban health policy, the scattering of resources over the policy landscape, and an inability to come up with a common language, or a common discourse, to *Those interested in learning about the movement can consult the Healthy Cities site on the World Wide Web: http://www.healthycities.org. Perhaps concentrating on cities per se will not be successful in the realities of the policy context and the political context. Perhaps the discussion about urban policy must be linked to something bigger and broader, larger coalitions, serving larger populations.
I think that a successful urban health policy depends on answering these kinds of questions and others like them. The discussion must remain focused so that some policy discourse and common terms will supervene.
